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Biography Is Destiny: The Case of 
Justice Peter V. Daniel 
Earl M. Maltz†
Judicial biographies are an indispensable resource for 
those of us seeking to understand the structure of 
constitutional law.  The evolution of this structure is 
determined by the interacting views of the shifting groups of 
nine individuals serving on the Court over time.  Each 
individual’s position reflects a unique set of influences and 
experiences.  Judicial biographies provide detailed accounts of 
these influences and experiences, thereby deepening our 
knowledge of the forces that ultimately shape Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. 
By contrast, more traditional modes of constitutional 
scholarship tend to focus only on certain parts of the Justices’ 
biographies to the exclusion of other significant influences on 
the development of their views.  For example, purely doctrinal 
descriptions of Supreme Court opinions implicitly reflect the 
understanding that all of the Justices have graduated from law 
school and, as such, have internalized and are to a greater or 
lesser degree influenced by the distinctive conventions of legal 
analysis that are at the core of the law school curriculum.  
Other analyses emphasize the political backgrounds and views 
of the Justices as the primary determinants of judicial 
decisionmaking—once again, emphasizing only one part of the 
Justices’ biographies. 
However, judicial decisions are often influenced by 
aspects of the Justices’ lives that are not easily assimilated into 
either doctrinal or political analysis.  Justice Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr.’s approach to privacy issues provides an example of such 
influences.  Powell’s approach to Roe v. Wade1 and its progeny 
was no doubt affected by his experience counseling a distraught 
 † Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden).  The text of this article 
will be incorporated into EARL M. MALTZ, DRED SCOTT AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY 
(University Press of Kansas, forthcoming). 
 1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
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young man who came to him for advice regarding an 
unplanned pregnancy at a time when abortion was illegal in 
Virginia.2  Conversely, Powell’s 1986 decision to provide the 
crucial fifth vote rejecting a challenge to a Texas anti-sodomy 
statute in Bowers v. Hardwick3 was likely influenced by his 
stated belief that he had never met a gay person—an assertion 
that, ironically, Powell made at a time when he employed a gay 
law clerk.4
Analogous factors can play a role even in the most 
unlikely of circumstances.  Consider the case of Justice Peter 
V. Daniel of Virginia. Although Daniel is the subject of a very 
fine biography by John P. Frank,5 those who are not deeply 
immersed in the constitutional law of slavery may never have 
even heard of him.  In the literature on Dred Scott v. 
Sandford,6 he is typically dismissed as an almost cartoonish 
character, the very embodiment of Southern extremism.  
Daniel is variously described as “a brooding proslavery 
fanatic,”7 a “bigot” with a “fanatical temper,”8 and a “zealot who 
hoped that his fellow southerners would go to ‘any extremity’ to 
ensure that slave property received greater protection than any 
other form of property.”9  In some respects, by 1857, these 
characterizations were quite accurate.  Closer examination, 
however, reveals that the forces that shaped Daniel’s views in 
Dred Scott were quite complex. 
Peter Vivian Daniel was born on April 24, 1784, on a 
family farm in Stafford County, Virginia, an agricultural region 
located approximately fifty miles south of Washington, D.C. 
and sixty miles north of Richmond.10  He received his early 
education from private tutors, and in 1802, spent a few months 
at Princeton before returning to Stafford County.  In 1805, 
Daniel moved to Richmond to study law in the offices of 
Edmund Randolph.  Randolph, a former aide to George 
  
 2 This incident is described in JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, 
JR. 347 (1994). 
 3 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 4 See JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 521. 
 5 JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF PETER V. 
DANIEL, 1784-1860 (1964). 
 6 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 7 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN 
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 234 (1978). 
 8 1 ALLAN NEVINS, THE EMERGENCE OF LINCOLN 103 (1950). 
 9 LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER: THE FREE NORTH AND 
SOUTHERN DOMINATION, 1780-1860, at 96 (2000). 
 10 The details of Daniel’s life are taken from FRANK, supra note 5. 
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Washington, had served as both Attorney General and 
Governor of Virginia.  In addition, he had represented Virginia 
in the Continental Congress and the Constitutional 
Convention.  After being admitted to the bar in 1808, Daniel 
came back to Stafford County to practice.  In 1809, he returned 
to Richmond as a representative to the state legislature, and in 
1810, married Randolph’s younger daughter, Lucy.  Thereafter 
Daniel permanently relocated to Richmond. 
The Randolph connection did not translate into great 
financial prosperity for the Daniel family.  Daniel was a 
committed Jeffersonian in a city whose business establishment 
was dominated by Federalists and later Whigs, men who 
tended to give their business to those who shared their political 
views.  Thus, throughout his life, Daniel’s income was far less 
than that of the exalted company in which he found himself. 
However, the son-in-law and protégé of Edmund 
Randolph did have immediate access to the highest circles in 
Virginia Democratic politics.  He quickly became a prominent 
member of the so-called “Richmond Junto,” a network of 
influential Democrats that dominated Virginia politics for 
much of the early nineteenth century.  Daniel’s formal base of 
power was his membership on the Virginia Council of State, a 
unique institution which shared executive power with the state 
governor.  Daniel served on the Council almost continuously 
from 1812 to 1835, and for much of that period was its senior 
member and, as such, Lieutenant Governor of the state. 
Beginning in the 1820s, Daniel also started taking an 
increasingly active role in national politics.  In 1824, the Junto 
threw its support behind presidential candidate William H. 
Crawford of Georgia.  The election was ultimately decided by 
the House of Representatives, with John Quincy Adams 
defeating both Crawford and Andrew Jackson.  In 1828, Daniel 
vigorously supported the ticket of Jackson and John C. 
Calhoun of South Carolina, and was rewarded as the Jackson-
Calhoun forces carried Virginia and thwarted Adams’ bid for 
reelection. 
Daniel had great admiration for Jackson; however, he 
had a much closer personal relationship with Jackson’s trusted 
lieutenant Martin Van Buren, the New York politician largely 
responsible for reinvigorating the Democratic Party in the late 
1820s.  In the early 1820s, Van Buren had established a 
political alliance between his Albany Regency and the 
Richmond Junto.  For more than two decades thereafter, 
Daniel maintained an active correspondence with the “Little 
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Magician,” strongly supporting his campaigns for the vice 
presidency in 1832 and the presidency in 1836.   
This personal relationship no doubt influenced Daniel’s 
thinking when Virginia Democrats split between supporters of 
Jackson and Calhoun during Jackson’s first term.  The key 
issue dividing the two factions was the protective tariff which 
had been adopted with Jackson’s support.  Daniel agreed with 
Calhoun on the substantive issue; nonetheless, he remained 
the titular leader of the Jackson Democrats in Virginia.  
Moreover, despite his lifelong commitment to states’ rights, 
Daniel continued to support the administration in its firm 
opposition to South Carolina’s claim that it had the right to 
nullify the tariff on constitutional grounds.  At the same time, 
Daniel also consistently adhered to the view that a state had 
the right to secede from the Union in response to more severe 
provocation. 
Daniel’s position on the tariff itself must have left him 
somewhat ambivalent in his support for Jackson against 
Calhoun and the State of South Carolina.  However, he had no 
compunctions about rallying behind the administration in its 
war with the Bank of the United States.  Daniel considered the 
Bank an abomination.  When asked to evaluate the claims of 
an aspirant to political office, Daniel replied, “He has professed 
a belief in the constitutionality of a national bank, and that is 
an objection which with me would overrule any and every 
recommendation which could be urged for him or for any other 
person.”11  Thus, Daniel enthusiastically supported Jackson’s 
decision to remove federal deposits and place them in state 
banks.  When Roger Brooke Taney left his position as Attorney 
General to oversee this process as Secretary of the Treasury, 
Jackson chose Daniel to be Taney’s replacement.  Daniel 
refused this appointment for financial reasons.  However, in 
March, 1836, when Philip P. Barbour left the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to become an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Daniel accepted an 
appointment to be his successor. 
Five years later, on February 25, 1841, Justice Barbour 
died in office.  Martin Van Buren, who succeeded Jackson in 
1836 but was defeated for reelection by Whig William Henry 
Harrison in 1840, had eight days left until his term expired.  
Seeking to deprive the Whigs of the opportunity to choose a 
  
 11 Id. at 113 (quoting Justice Daniel). 
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Justice, Van Buren quickly appointed Daniel to succeed 
Barbour on the Court. 
A brief but intense political struggle over the 
nomination soon followed.  The dispute over slavery that would 
soon become so prominent played no role in this struggle; 
instead, the dispute was simply an incident in the ongoing 
battle for political power between the Democrats and the 
Whigs.  Democrats in the Senate had enough votes for 
confirmation.  Whigs, however, knew that if they could delay 
Senate action for just eight days, the nomination would 
automatically die and the seat would be filled by a Harrison 
nominee.   
Daniel’s opponents pursued a two-pronged strategy in 
seeking to achieve this objective.12  They first sought to take 
advantage of the fact that recently admitted southwestern 
states were not yet part of any circuit and had no 
representation on the Supreme Court.  The Whigs introduced a 
bill that would have remedied this situation by abolishing the 
existing Fourth Circuit, merging Virginia and North Carolina 
into other existing circuits, and creating a new southwestern 
circuit in place of the Fourth. They hoped thereby to entice 
some southwestern Democrats to oppose Daniel in the hope of 
having a Justice appointed from their own region to service the 
new circuit. 
This part of the strategy was a partial success.  The 
circuit reorganization bill passed the Senate, and some 
southwestern Democrats abandoned the Daniel nomination.  
Nonetheless, after it became apparent that the Senate bill 
could not be acted upon in the House of Representatives, it also 
became clear that Daniel retained enough support to be 
confirmed if the matter came to a vote on the merits.   
In their second attempt to defeat Daniel’s nomination, 
the Whigs tried to deprive the Senate of a quorum by 
abandoning the chamber en masse.  This attempt failed by the 
narrowest of margins after the Democratic leadership scoured 
the city of Washington in a desperate effort to locate absent 
Democratic senators.  Thus, shortly after midnight on March 2, 
1841, Peter V. Daniel was confirmed as an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court. 
Van Buren reported to Jackson that, in nominating 
Daniel, he had taken the opportunity “to put a man on the 
  
 12 Id. at 155-60 (describing the struggle over Daniel’s confirmation). 
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bench of the Supreme Court . . . who will I am sure stick to the 
true principles of the constitution, and being a Democrat ab ovo 
[literally, from the egg] is not in so much danger of a falling off 
in the true spirit.”13  In many respects, the tall, spare, dark-
complected Daniel met or even exceeded Van Buren’s 
expectations.  A true agrarian conservative, Daniel was deeply 
committed to the constitutional theories embodied in the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and the work of John 
Taylor.  He viewed the defense of these principles against the 
Whigs’ nationalist, pro-business policies as an apocalyptic 
struggle between good and evil.  Daniel’s public comments on 
politics were notable for their forcefulness; he was described by 
one political opponent as “one of the most violent partisan 
writers in the state.”14  Daniel was no less emphatic in private.  
In an 1832 letter to Van Buren, he described the forthcoming 
election as a “great struggle between democracy and the 
constitution on the one hand, and corruption and profligacy 
unexampled on the other.”15  He declared, “The conflict we are 
now waging [is] against that worst of all influences; that which 
puts intelligence, probity, patriotism, falsehood, venality, vice 
in every form, all upon an equality, that is, values them merely 
as they can become means to be wielded to its purposes—the 
influence of money.”16  Similarly, after meeting Daniel Webster, 
Daniel reported, “My hand was actually contaminated by 
contact with his.”17  In short, as John P. Frank has aptly 
observed, “[T]he Daniel who came to the Court in 1841 . . . was 
a man of controversy, ferocious, unyielding, and utterly 
humorless in dispute.”18
These attitudes and personal characteristics shaped 
Daniel’s treatment of the constitutional issues that came before 
the Taney Court.  Not surprisingly, the Chief Justice was 
Daniel’s closest friend and ideological ally on the Court; 
however, Daniel was considerably less compromising than 
Taney in his position on issues such as federalism and the 
rights of corporations.  He dissented alone more than twice as 
often as any other Justice during his tenure, and more than 
  
 13 Id. at 160-61 (quoting Martin Van Buren). 
 14 Id. at 88. 
 15 Id. at 87 (quoting Justice Daniel). 
 16 FRANK, supra note 5, at 87 (quoting Justice Daniel). 
 17 Id. at 88 (quoting Justice Daniel). 
 18 Id. at 166. 
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three times as often as Taney, John Catron, and John A. 
Campbell combined.19
One of the most notable features of Daniel’s 
jurisprudence was his opposition to the expansion of federal 
power.  On a variety of issues ranging from the interpretation 
of the commerce power to questions of federal jurisdiction, 
Daniel consistently argued that the authority of the federal 
government should be circumscribed within narrow limits.20  
However, he was apparently willing to subordinate this 
principle to the need to protect Southern interests.  For 
example, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,21 Daniel concurred in the 
view that Congress did not exceed its authority in passing the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. 
On the issue of federal exclusivity, however, Daniel’s 
position was far more consistent with the overall pattern of his 
jurisprudence.  Throughout the 1840s, he joined Taney and 
Samuel Nelson in strenuously arguing that, in the absence of 
contrary federal legislation, the Commerce Clause by its terms 
did not divest the states of the power to regulate or tax 
interstate commerce.  These Justices were, however, unable to 
attract majority support for a single opinion embodying this 
view.  Thus, in 1851, both Taney and Nelson agreed to join a 
compromise majority opinion in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,22 
which proclaimed that federal power over matters of national 
concern was exclusive, but that the states retained concurrent 
authority to regulate interstate commerce in situations where 
local interest predominated.  Among the previous advocates of 
nonexclusivity, Daniel stood alone in rejecting the compromise.  
Displaying what might be described as either an admirable 
devotion to principle or simple blind stubbornness, he 
continued to insist that only congressional action could deprive 
the states of their inherent authority to regulate commerce.23
This theme of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction 
also dominated Daniel’s opinion in Prigg.24  The basic theme of 
his opinion is that, while Congress possessed authority to 
implement the Fugitive Slave Clause, states also retained 
  
 19 Id. at 237. 
 20 E.g., The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 463-
65 (1851) (Daniel, J., dissenting); Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 180-81 
(1845) (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
 21 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 650-57 (1842) (Daniel, J., concurring). 
 22 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
 23 Id. at 325-26 (Daniel, J., concurring). 
 24 41 U.S. at 650-57 (Daniel, J., concurring). 
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power to pass laws that would provide further aid to the 
slaveowner.  Most of Daniel’s opinion is devoted to a systematic 
canvass of authorities that, he contended, supported the theory 
of concurrent power in general terms.  Daniel also emphasized 
the symbolic effect of a holding of federal exclusivity in the 
specific context of the Fugitive Slave Clause: 
[S]uppose that a fugitive from service should have fled to a state 
where slavery does not exist, and in which the prevalent feeling is 
hostile to that institution; there might, nevertheless, in such a 
community, be a disposition to yield something to an acknowledged 
constitutional right—something to national comity too, in the 
preservation of that right; but let it once be proclaimed from this 
tribunal, that any concession by the states towards the maintenance 
of such a right, is a positive offence, the violation of a solemn duty, 
and I ask what pretext more plausible could be offered to those who 
are disposed to protect the fugitive, or to defeat the rights of the 
master?  The Constitution and the act of Congress would thus be 
converted into instruments for the destruction of that which they 
were designed especially to protect.25
Finally, Daniel rejected the argument that states might, under 
the guise of legislation purportedly designed to protect the 
rights of slaveowners, actually impede the recovery of fugitives.  
He observed that analogous arguments might be made against 
the grant of enforcement power to the federal government, and 
that “should . . . abuses be attempted, the corrective may be 
found . . . in the controlling constitutional authority of this 
Court.”26
Daniel argued that states not only possessed the power 
to pass supplementary legislation, but that such legislation 
was, in fact, desirable.  Seemingly accepting Justice Story’s 
conclusion that state officials could not be compelled to 
participate in the enforcement of the federal statute, Daniel 
observed that federal law enforcement officials were far less 
numerous than their state counterparts, and that state 
legislation might therefore be necessary to provide the 
slaveholder with any effective governmental assistance.27
Obviously, Daniel’s opinion in Prigg reflects the views of 
a Southerner committed to the defense of slavery. His 
concurrence was clearly influenced by both ordinary political 
considerations and distinctively legal analysis.  Daniel’s 
  
 25 Id. at 657. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 656-57. 
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endorsement of Story’s view that Congress had power to 
legislate in support of slaveowners’ rights was in some tension 
with Daniel’s position as the Taney era’s foremost advocate of 
limited federal power.  However, his advocacy of the concurrent 
power doctrine was no more than a simple application of the 
principles that Daniel espoused in other contexts.  In short, 
while clearly adopting a position that was more proslavery 
than that of Justice Story, Daniel’s opinion was no more 
intemperate in substance and tone than the analogous 
antislavery opinion of Justice McLean. 
Yet despite his unyielding commitment to the defense of 
slavery, prior to 1847, Daniel would have been an unlikely 
candidate to produce the kind of inflammatory opinion that he 
produced in Dred Scott.  Daniel’s political alliance with Martin 
Van Buren was a model of bisectional cooperation, and his 
opinion in Prigg, while undoubtedly pro-Southern, was 
moderate in tone.  Moreover, Daniel was one of the few 
Southerners who opposed the movement to annex Texas, 
viewing it as a Calhounite conspiracy. 
At the same time, however, Daniel took offense to 
Northerners who opposed annexation because the addition of 
Texas would benefit the slave state.  In 1844, he expressed this 
outrage to Van Buren in the strongest terms: 
Can anything be more galling to the spirit of honorable men than to 
be told that it is enough to justify the condemnation of any measure, 
that its effect may be the promotion of their peculiar interests and 
welfare: that it may prove advantageous to the holders of slave 
property?  Are we to be placed under  permanent and unrelenting 
ban of the Federal Government?  To be held as less than the equals 
of our miscalled fellow citizens?  To be regarded as the plague-spot 
upon our nation, and then required by our oppressors and revilers to 
shout for our blessed Union?  A blessed Union indeed it would be 
upon such terms.  No—No—The most temperate amongst us, would 
not hesitate to decide, if things have come or are to come to this 
complexion, to go with our imputed blemishes, our crimes and 
defilements, apart to ourselves; and leave these exclusively beautiful 
and moral and clean and immaculate, to their own purity.28
The dispute over the Wilmot Proviso crystallized 
Daniel’s outrage.  As early as 1845, Daniel privately expressed 
the view that federal legislation explicitly limiting the right of 
slaveowners to bring slaves into the territories would be 
grounds for secession.  Nonetheless, he expressed his 
  
 28 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, at 560-61 (quoting Justice Daniel). 
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willingness to accept the general idea of geographical division 
as a workable compromise.  Two years later, the New York 
State Democratic Convention adopted a resolution supporting 
the position that slavery should be outlawed in all of the 
territory obtained from Mexico.  Daniel wrote to Van Buren 
seeking clarification of his position on this issue.  When Van 
Buren replied evasively, Daniel (whose wife had recently died 
from a stroke) responded that if Van Buren in fact supported 
the Wilmot Proviso, 
I shall have lived to witness a development, that even the great 
overwhelming and stunning personal calamity which has come upon 
me cannot prevent me from contemplating with deep sorrow and 
alarm.  I shall have been constrained to perceive on the part of those, 
on whom of all the public men in this nation I imposed the greatest 
trust, what my deliberate convictions compel me to view as the 
overthrow of the great national compact; as the extreme of injury 
and oppression; oppression in its most galling form, because it 
declares to me that I am not regarded as an equal.29
Daniel’s mortification could only have been magnified in 1848, 
when Van Buren became the presidential candidate of the Free 
Soil Party. 
The impact of Daniel’s sense of personal betrayal on the 
subsequent evolution of his political thought cannot be reliably 
assessed.  What is clear is that beginning in the late 1840s, 
Daniel associated all things Northern with the antislavery 
movement, and hated the North with an obsessive fury that he 
had hitherto reserved for his Whig political enemies.  He 
refused to venture north of the Delaware River and became 
indifferent to the preservation of the Union itself.  When 
Daniel’s great-nephew made a favorable comment regarding 
those who took antislavery positions, Daniel replied simply, “I 
fear those people are very wicked.”30
The language of Daniel’s concurring opinion in Dred 
Scott reveals the depth of his bitterness over what he saw as 
betrayal by his one-time friend and ally.  Based upon what he 
believed were “truths which a knowledge of the history of the 
world, and particularly of that of our own country, compels us 
to know,”31 Daniel contended that: 
  
 29 Frank, supra note 5, at 245-46 (quoting Justice Daniel). 
 30 5 SWISHER, supra note 28, at 70 (quoting Justice Daniel). 
 31 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 475 (Daniel, J., concurring). 
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[T]he African negro race never have been acknowledged as belonging 
to the family of nations; that as amongst them there never has been 
known or recognised by the inhabitants of other countries anything 
partaking of the character of nationality, or civil or political polity; 
that this race has been by all the nations of Europe regarded as 
subjects of capture or purchase; as subjects of commerce or traffic; 
and that the introduction of that race into every section of this 
country was not as members of civil or political society, but as slaves, 
as property in the strictest sense of the term.32
Later, addressing the claim that Congress could 
constitutionally bar slavery from the territories, Daniel argued: 
Can there be imputed to the sages and patriots by whom the 
Constitution was framed, or can there be detected in the text of that 
Constitution, or in any rational construction or implication deducible 
therefrom, a contradiction so palpable as would exist between a 
pledge to the slaveholder of an equality with his fellow-citizens, 
and . . . a warrant given . . . to another, to rob him of that property, 
or to subject him to proscription and disfranchisement for possessing 
or for endeavoring to retain it?  The injustice and extravagance 
necessarily implied in a supposition like this, cannot be rationally 
imputed to the patriotic or the honest, or to those who were merely 
sane.33
Of course, even if he had never broken with Van Buren, Daniel 
might well have reached the same conclusions in Dred Scott 
(although he probably would have expressed his views in more 
temperate language).  Nonetheless, the basic point remains.  
The views of judges are not shaped only by legal theory and 
political ideology, but by the totality of their life experiences.  
Thus, the work of biographers such as John P. Frank, Linda 
Greenhouse,34 and Dennis Hutchinson35 is indispensable to 
those who hope to truly understand the judicial process. 
  
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 490. 
 34 LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S 
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2005). 
 35 DENNIS HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A 
PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE (1998). 
